Northern Ireland and Turkey) on the territory of the State party as the jurisprudence is indicative of what the Court may require in an extra-territorial context. One would indeed expect the Court to assess similar situations of (armed) violence whether at home or abroad in a similar manner. Only exceptionally will cases concerning peacetime, lawenforcement operations be used. Second, the experience of the British armed forces illustrates the challenges faced by armed forces in conducting an appropriate and lawful investigation into a potential breach of Article 2 ECHR in an extra-territorial context. The reasons for choosing the UK as a case-study are manifold. First, the overwhelming majority of ECtHR cases relating to the application of the procedural limb of Article 2 in an armed conflict or situation of violence in an extra-territorial context were brought against the UK. Second, prior and after these judgments a vigorous, albeit not always rigorous, debate was held in the UK leading to a flurry of comments and reports useful to identify the challenges faced by the armed forces. 21 Third, the UK is viewed as a State 'that operate [s] at the highest end of investigative processes and procedures'. 22 Also, the British armed forces have, following the case-law of the Court, made changes to the way they work, 23 thereby demonstrating good will in trying to comply with the Court's requirements. If they struggle to abide by the Court's requirements it is likely that forces of other States will do too.
This article starts by explaining when the duty to investigate arises in the specific situation of an armed conflict or violence. It then proceeds to applying the principles (and 21 For example, judgments in English courts, written evidence submitted to Parliament by either the government or individuals with relevant expertise, and official reports. Informal discussions with military legal advisers have also assisted the author in gaining a better understanding of the situation. The sources of professional expertise on the practicalities of investigations abroad must be handled with caution, as they reflect a certain perception of the law and its application 22 is, where armed forces are engaged on the territory of a State that is not a party to the ECHR, the aim being to highlight elements that might be difficult to comply with. It then suggests that the Court should infuse in its jurisprudence a contextual approach that would allow it to confirm its case-law relating to armed conflict on the territory of a member State whilst adapting it to the realities of conflicts abroad.
THE DUTY TO INVESTIGATE UNDER ARTICLE 2 ECHR
It is established that although international humanitarian law is the legal regime that regulates armed conflict human rights law applies too. 24 In some instances, these bodies of law are complementary and in others their rules collide, thereby calling for the application of the doctrine of lex specialis. 25 Which rule prevails depends on the specific situation as the lex specialis doctrine operates on the level of norms and not legal regimes.
It is often assumed that IHL rules are more specific than those of human rights law. The reverse is however true and the rules relating to investigations into unlawful killings are a testimony to it. Whilst IHL sets out such a duty 26 its rules are not very developed 27 to the effect that one could argue that human rights law, by providing a more detailed set of principles, supports and reinforces the IHL duty to investigate. Once the obligation arises, the State must comply with the principles spelled out by the Court, the first being that the investigation be effective.
PRINCIPLE OF EFFECTIVE INVESTIGATION
Determining the legality of the use of force entails collecting and securing evidence that sheds light on the circumstances that have led to the loss of life. In this process, it is imperative that potential suspects be identified. Indeed, major shortcomings in the investigation might undermine the ability to identify the perpetrator and thus 'the bringing Ensuring that each individual leaves separately and safely might not be possible, and therefore the Court displays a certain lack of flexibility in the application of this element in an extra-territorial setting.
Second, members of the armed forces must be interrogated about the incident 64 in an adequate manner. The Court has indicated that reliance on written evidence and/or reports produced by them, 65 as well as transcripts of interviews, was not sufficient, as it does not allow for the reliability or credibility of the accounts of those involved in the incident to be verified. 66 Crucial factual elements might have been, voluntarily or not, omitted, and contradictory information might not be cross-checked. 67 As a result, failure to collect the testimony of those implicated in the incidents might render it difficult to ascertain whether the force used was justified. It is submitted that, ideally, such interviews should take place back in the compound to ensure the security of all those involved. The reality is that military witnesses may not be interviewed quickly after the incident and in fact 'be deployed elsewhere or be engaged in combat' 68 and therefore unable to provide evidence. As a consequence, to ensure that the testimony of those involved in the incident is gathered promptly, the State should take steps so that these individuals remain available for questioning and are not deployed quickly after the incident. This also highlights the fact that the State must ensure that it deploys a sufficient number of military personnel as it would otherwise not be in a position to continue military operations whilst its personnel is being interviewed. This is neither a practical nor a legal impediment but one related to the allocation of resources by the government. understanding of the situation. An additional element that needs to be assessed is that the autopsy report must be translated. 104 As aforementioned, translators and interpreters must be made available to the armed forces.
Overall, it is not an easy task for the armed forces to follow the principle of effective investigation in an extra-territorial context. The Court's requirements are reasonable though in some instances, it is a difficult, though not an impossible, mission.
With increased manpower and better resources, the armed forces would be in a better position though. The only real and in fact legal hurdle relates to carrying out autopsies when the territorial State has the right to take the body, and thus the armed forces are faced with an impossible mission to comply with the law. The Court has shown in this particular instance very little flexibility. It is rather disconcerting because the Court has on numerous occasions repeated that the obligation to undertake an effective investigation is not one of results but means. 
PRINCIPLES OF PROMPT AND INDEPENDENT INVESTIGATION
Two additional interrelated principles are that the investigation be prompt and independent so as to ensure that the public maintains confidence in the State's monopoly of the use of force. incident and that thereafter a further report be written by an officer within 48 hours with a view to assisting the Commanding Officer in deciding on the next course of action.
A potential noteworthy problem is the quality of the report as the Court dismisses justifications, such as reports being drafted in the heat of the moment and in which there are so-called 'innocent omissions'. 114 Fulfilling the principle of promptness does not indeed displace the State's obligation to carry out an effective investigation.
INDEPENDENT INVESTIGATION
An additional requirement is that those investigating the incident must be independent from those implicated in the events. 115 Much alike the justification for an investigation to be prompt, the requirement of independence is warranted by the need for public confidence.
The Court has stressed that, irrespective of the form of the investigation, 'the independence of the investigation implies not only the absence of a hierarchical or institutional connection, but also independence in practical terms', 116 an element that also applies in a military context. 117 At first sight, this requirement appears to be difficult to comply with, bearing in mind that there are no other investigative authorities present on the territory apart from the armed forces themselves and the local police. In this context, the armed forces play the dual role of law-violator and law-enforcer. Yet, practice and case-law show that compliance is feasible.
Institutional independence is understood as the ability of the investigating authorities to act without interference. 118 The case of Al-Skeini is emblematic of the 
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Practical independence, on the other hand, relates to a physical dimension, the close proximity between the investigators and those implicated. Yet, as the Court explained in Jaloud, the fact that they shared quarters or that the investigators were subordinated to the investigated were not seen as running foul of the principle. 125 The reason for this was that there did not seem to be any nexus between the investigators and the individuals implicated in the incident.
126
Whilst this judgment shows that the Court has some understanding of the difficulty of separating armed forces deployed abroad, it confirms the jurisprudence relating to the need to ensure that the investigation be independent in law and in practice.
Case-law emphasises that the principle of independence is interrelated with the other principles 127 and that ultimately the Court 'allows for independence to be contentious to a certain degree insofar as it does not hinder effectiveness of the investigation'. 128 This may elucidate the leeway given to the Dutch armed forces inasmuch as the lack of independence did not have any practical implications on the effectiveness of the investigation.
In conclusion the armed forces are able to abide by the principles of promptness and independence. Here, it is not 'mission impossible' at all, and the Court gives States some latitude. Yet, there is a further requirement that needs to be met, that of public scrutiny in the investigation.
PRINCIPLE OF PUBLIC SCRUTINY IN THE INVESTIGATION
As Chevalier-Watts explains, 'the procedural obligations balance the requirements on a state and recognize its position in a liberal democracy whilst recognizing the rights of victims' families and acknowledging the need to restore public confidence'. 129 The twin aims are to allow for victim participation and challenge of the outcome of the investigation, as well as to ensure public scrutiny more generally: 'public scrutiny provides a procedural safeguard'. Whilst it is accepted that 'the degree of public scrutiny required may well vary from case to case', in all cases, the victim or next-of-kin must be involved in the procedure 136 'to the extent necessary to safeguard his or her legitimate interests'. with a right to information 139 (for example, the right to access the case file 140 ). As a result, individuals have 'some sort of right to active participation in the investigation'. 141 To allow for the next-of kin's involvement, the victim must first be identified and then the next-of-kin informed of his/her death. In an extra-territorial context, this requirement might be difficult to satisfy, as armed forces might not know the local population well.
Often, it is the next-of-kin who will, later, approach, through a lawyer, the armed forces and is then included in other types of investigations, such as judicial review, rather than in earlier investigations. If that is the case, then there is no violation of Article 2 ECHR since the involvement of the next-of-kin has been ensured at a later stage.
The Court has also set limits on the extent to which relatives can be involved and the concomitant duties of the authorities. This is particularly relevant in military operations with specific rules of engagement, classified materials, information on sources of intelligence, and so on that may compromise national security. 142 The Court has shown some flexibility by accepting that the disclosure or publication of materials that deal with abroad, the difficulty resides in informing the relatives of the outcome, as they might not be traceable in enemy held territory, or communication with them might be, for practical reasons, impossible. 151 Moreover, the reasons for reaching such an outcome might be that some information is confidential or has been provided by informers whose safety might be at stake. That being said, the State is allowed to draw with care and skill a justification so as to both respect the rights of the victims and their next-of-kin and avoid undue prejudice to others.
As a conclusion, the principle of public scrutiny can be partially fulfilled by the armed forces abroad. Practical impediments that are clearly visible in the initial stages of the investigations can however be remedied later on using other, additional methods of investigation. The Court's flexibility in that regard is welcome. The principles of effectiveness, promptness, independence and public scrutiny of investigations into alleged violations of Article 2 ECHR appear to contain a few elements with which it might be difficult, though not necessarily impossible, for armed forces deployed abroad to comply. For some, the Court appears to be unable or unwilling to understand these difficulties, and thus the question is whether it might be possible to instil further flexibility in the Court's jurisprudence.
INSTILLING FURTHER FLEXIBILITY IN THE COURT'S JURISPRUDENCE
It must be reminded that the Court has crafted principles and elements thereof based on situations either happening in a domestic setting and/or in peacetime and has applied them to military operations at home and abroad. As a result, while they might be perfectly suitable in this limited context, they are, as illustrated above, sometimes too detailed and difficult to apply outside the national territory of a State. It is argued that the Court should espouse a contextual approach when applying these requirements. The point is not to criticise the principles and elements as such but to instil more flexibility in their application.
To appreciate why the Court has crafted such elaborate elements within the principles, it is worth recalling that the very aim of its existence is to provide a supranational remedy to individuals whose rights have been violated and not remedied at national level. It would defeat the purpose of the Convention if States could avoid being sanctioned by simply claiming that running an investigation was too difficult. After all, 'a duty to investigate is not a duty for its own sake; it is supposed to serve justice and enhance respect for law by punishing violators and providing victims with potential grounds for due compensation'. Indeed, besides safeguarding the substantive rights enunciated in the Convention, the Court has developed an approach towards securing such rights, thereby espousing a 'practical and effective' interpretation doctrine. 153 The right to life is one of these archetypal rights that has been so interpreted as to secure effective respect by not only ensuring that life is not taken arbitrarily but also that a mechanism be in place to ensure that, if it does happen, the State is obliged to examine whether a violation has occurred.
In rather than 'difficulties' faced by the armed forces when deployed abroad.
The Court has underlined that it has granted some leeway to States and is cognisant of the inherent practical difficulties faced by the investigators performing their tasks. 160 It thus seemingly allows for a contextual approach towards compliance. In AlSkeini, the Court conceded that 'in circumstances such as these the procedural duty under Article 2 must be applied realistically, to take account of specific problems faced by the investigators'. 161 In particular, it noted that such circumstances might lead to investigators using less effective methods and to delays. 162 The Court goes to great length to formally acknowledge the difficult situation, it 'is prepared to make reasonable allowances for the relatively difficult conditions under which the Netherlands military and investigators had to work'. 163 The Court specifically mentions the fact that the investigators are in a foreign country, they are not familiar with the language and culture of the country, the local population is hostile towards them, there is a shortage of local pathologists and facilities for autopsies, the danger inherent in any activity at that time, and so on.
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However Al-Skeini and Jaloud reveal that the Court is sometimes not prepared to acknowledge in its application of the law the inherent constraints that impede a full and effective investigation. 165 In these cases, 'the Court has simply applied the Convention Yet, it seems that even when States take all reasonable steps and explore various avenues, such as in Jaloud, they run foul of the requirements.
One way to instil flexibility in the application of the principles and elements is for the Court to follow its jurisprudence which it spelled out in plain terms in the Tunç and Tunç case in 2015 by ensuring that these principles 'are criteria which, taken jointly, enable the degree of effectiveness of the investigation to be assessed'. 170 In the Jaloud and Al Skeini cases the Court seemed sometimes too focused on specific, detailed elements and losing the overview of the purpose of Article 2 ECHR. As the Judges in the Joint Concurring Opinion in Jaloud ask: 'Is it really within the competence of our Court to set the standards for investigations at this detailed level in unstable situations such as these which prevailed in Iraq?'. 171 If, as the Court maintains, the aim of the procedural 166 In relation to the Chechen cases, see Borelli (n 4) 29 167 ibid 32 168 Jaloud (n 13) para 8 169 Al-Skeini and Others (n 13) para 67 (emphasis added). See also Isayeva (n 12) para 212 170 Tunç and Tunç (n 11) para 225. See also Lovyginy (n 11) para 103; Sarbyanova-Pashaliyaska and Pashaliyska (n 16) para 37; Síním (n 11) para 65; Mazepa and Others (n 16) para 70 171 Jaloud (n 13) para 7 aspect of Article 2 ECHR is to secure effective respect for the right to life, then surely what matters most is that the investigation be effective overall and not that each principle/element be observed. It is thus submitted that the guiding principles of adequacy of the investigative measures, the promptness and independence of the investigation, as well the public scrutiny of the investigation, must be taken as a whole. In doing so, the Court would be able to offer some flexibility in its approach.
Some principles, such as that of promptness, independence and public scrutiny, are reasonable and can be fulfilled by armed forces operating abroad. However, where flexibility and situational awareness is sought is in relation to the elements of the principle of effectiveness. The Court needs to understand that investigations in an extra-territorial context are carried out in a different environment where often an established rule of law framework does not exist, the population is extremely hostile, enforcing the law or performing certain tasks might lead to further hostility and might in fact jeopardise the mission, the nature and quantity of the resources available (for example, human resources, logistics) is limited, the armed forces must often work with foreign troops as part of a multinational operations which operate under specific legal rules, the host State has to comply with its own international legal obligations, and so on. 172 The Court must take these factors into account when examining whether the armed forces have undertaken an effective investigation. It is thus imperative that 'the specificities of the obligation must be interpreted in context'. In earlier case-law, the Court stated that '[t]he armed forces of a country exist to protect the liberties valued by a democratic society, and so the armed forces should not be allowed to march over, and cause substantial damage to such principles'. 174 This article does not argue that the armed forces should be free of constraints when deployed in an extra-territorial context. The role of the Court is 'to challenge bad faith and a lack of political will, which poses an obstacle to adherence to Convention rights'. Whilst the author concedes that adopting a flexible, contextual approach would result in limiting the possibility to punish those responsible and provide adequate remedy to victims and thus seems to offer a 'sliding scale' of duties, it must be stressed that the obligation to investigate still remains. After all, States still need to prove that they fulfilled their 'obligations of means' by using all feasible means and methods to abide by the principles.
